Cryptocurrencies are no longer just a part of the literature concerning the financing of terrorism but are now part of the daily routine of prosecutors and financial intelligence units. Its role in the financial landscape at large, however, is not widely understood and is frequently exaggerated. This chapter will cover the ways in which terrorist groups and their sponsors have used digital assets to solicit funds, transport funds, store funds, and spend funds. It starts with technology itself. Today, more cryptocurrencies exist in USD-denominated stable coins than in Bitcoin, as a cryptocurrency is a bearer instrument recorded on a shared public ledger and transferred without the use of a bank. Technical properties form the basis and starting point for this paper, as they determine not only why the channel is attractive to the illegal users, but also why it exposes them. The chapter then situates digital assets within the comfort zone of the traditional three-stage model of money laundering, demonstrating what placement, layering and integration look like on a blockchain, as well as collating enforcement records and analytics to draw a connection between virtual assets and terrorist financing. Case reconstruction follows. It refers to the Al-Qassam Brigades of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad networks, and Al-Qaeda and Islamic State networks via Turkey, Central Asia and Southeast Asia, as well as the Iran-aligned architecture that supports Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. These cases are then grouped into a 4-layer model of solicitation, custodial concentration, obfuscation and cash-out, which is applicable to otherwise diverse organizations. The record only has one paradox. The publicly accessible blockchain that affords financiers access and freedom from banks also leaves a clear paper trail that has helped make it easy to attribute, seizure and prosecution many times. Finally, the chapter finds that donor financing for fundraising and the use of state-proxy treasury are separate issues that require separate solutions, and that policy to combat the financing of terrorism should be based on the actual volume of financing documented in transactions, not the numbers generated in the immediate aftermath of an attack.